Today, in addition to a suicide bombing in Iraq that killed four American soldiers, an ambush in Afghanistan (remember the war in Afghanistan?) killed two more. You don’t need to be a seer to see such things coming. No one can conquer this world and the foolishness of trying in the name of anything is almost unbearable to watch, and undoubtedly far more unbearable to take part in.
At the end of the first full week plus of war in Iraq, the surprising thing is how quickly the many sides of American imperial vulnerability are being exposed. As a start, the developing war has clarified one matter: the Bush administration only listened to those Iraqis, in exile, whose dreams fit with its own global fantasies. Here’s part of a remarkable, almost touching passage from al-Mutamar, the paper of the Iraqi National Congress, an opposition group. Paul Woodward, editor of www.warincontext.org, googled it up and posted it at his site. In it, Kan’an Mikiya, author of The Republic of Fear, and two other exiles have a conversation with President Bush:
“the president began to ask us about the Iraqis and Iraq. The first question was: ‘What reaction do you expect from the Iraqis to the entry of US forces into their cities?'” Mr Makiya explained that ‘each of us agreed that all Iraqis of all sects would welcome these forces from the very first moment. I added: ‘The Iraqis will welcome the US forces with flowers and sweets when they come in.’
“President Bush then moved on to his second question: ‘If the initial bombardment of Iraq is severe, will the reaction be the same? I mean, will they still welcome the US army?’ ‘I stressed to President Bush my personal opinion that ‘the regime will be destroyed with the first blow’ Prof Makiya said he expected ‘no real fighting right from the start of the war'”
You might want then to take a look at quite a different sort of document from the group that runs the iraqwar.ru website. It’s evidently some sort of Russian intelligence group that has begun issuing reports, translated into English, on the military aspects of the Iraq war. It was recommended to me by someone knowledgeable, but I have no way of assessing the accuracy of its information – or the extent of its mis- or disinformation. However, what you get from it is a sense of how this war, in the eyes of many in the world, is already achieving results quite different from those the Bush administration hoped for. War in Iraq was clearly meant to be a lesson for the world – and so it may be, just possibly in unintended ways. The administration wanted to demonstrate American military invulnerability, the extent of American power. What they have demonstrated instead is American vulnerability. You can sense that in the provisional end-of-the-first-week conclusions of the Russian “journalists and military experts” – undoubtedly encouraged by what they see — based on what they claim to be “Russian military intelligence reports.” Here’s an excerpt (the English is imperfect but quite understandable):
“The first myth is about the precision-guided weapons as the determining factor in modern warfare, weapons that allow to achieve strategic superiority without direct contact with the enemy. On the one hand we have the fact that during the past 13 years the wars were won by the United States with minimum losses and, in essence, primarily through the use of aviation. At the same time, however, the US military command was stubborn in ignoring that the decisive factor in all these wars was not the military defeat of the resisting armies but political isolation coupled with strong diplomatic pressure on the enemy’s political leadership. It was the creation of international coalitions against Iraq in 1991, against Yugoslavia in 1999 and against Afghanistan in 2001 that ensured the military success.
“The American command preferred not to notice the obvious military failures during expeditions to Grenada, Libya and Somalia, discounting them as “local operations” not deserving much attention.
“President Bush then moved on to his second question: ‘If the initial bombardment of Iraq is severe, will the reaction be the same? I mean, will they still welcome the US army?’ ‘I stressed to President Bush my personal opinion that ‘the regime will be destroyed with the first blow’ Prof Makiya said he expected ‘no real fighting right from the start of the war'”
You might want then to take a look at quite a different sort of document from the group that runs the iraqwar.ru website. It’s evidently some sort of Russian intelligence group that has begun issuing reports, translated into English, on the military aspects of the Iraq war. It was recommended to me by someone knowledgeable, but I have no way of assessing the accuracy of its information – or the extent of its mis- or disinformation. However, what you get from it is a sense of how this war, in the eyes of many in the world, is already achieving results quite different from those the Bush administration hoped for. War in Iraq was clearly meant to be a lesson for the world – and so it may be, just possibly in unintended ways. The administration wanted to demonstrate American military invulnerability, the extent of American power. What they have demonstrated instead is American vulnerability. You can sense that in the provisional end-of-the-first-week conclusions of the Russian “journalists and military experts” – undoubtedly encouraged by what they see — based on what they claim to be “Russian military intelligence reports.” Here’s an excerpt (the English is imperfect but quite understandable):
“The first myth is about the precision-guided weapons as the determining factor in modern warfare, weapons that allow to achieve strategic superiority without direct contact with the enemy. On the one hand we have the fact that during the past 13 years the wars were won by the United States with minimum losses and, in essence, primarily through the use of aviation. At the same time, however, the US military command was stubborn in ignoring that the decisive factor in all these wars was not the military defeat of the resisting armies but political isolation coupled with strong diplomatic pressure on the enemy’s political leadership. It was the creation of international coalitions against Iraq in 1991, against Yugoslavia in 1999 and against Afghanistan in 2001 that ensured the military success.
“The American command preferred not to notice the obvious military failures during expeditions to Grenada, Libya and Somalia, discounting them as “local operations” not deserving much attention.
“Today we can see that in itself massed use of strategic and tactical precision-guided weapons did not provide the US with a strategic advantage [though, they later comment, they give the U.S. military a very distinct battlefield advantage]. Despite the mass use of the most sophisticated weapons the Americans have so far failed to disrupt Iraqi command and control infrastructure, communication networks, top Iraqi military and political leadership, Iraqi air defenses. At the same time the US precision-guided weapons arsenal has been reduced by about 25%.”
To read the whole report click here
What follows below is the latest analysis from Paul Rogers of the openDemocracy website. He offers five outcomes for the war, two of which already seem inconceivable – and, though other scenarios are possible, he’s a distinctly sane fellow with a fine track record for thoughtfulness and accuracy. Nonetheless, my own guess is that, had he written this the day before the war began the final, unlikely alternative, “defeat” wouldn’t even have made it on board.
In addition, I’ve included a powerful piece from this week’s Nation magazine — Jonathan Schell’s “The Other Superpower.” After all, it’s with the earth’s assorted peoples above all that this administration has not just shown American vulnerability but, you might say, created it. If you want to see an example of what’s happening globally, just look at a piece on Spain, Aznar faces 91% opposition to war, in today’s Guardian. (“The Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, the third man on the international stage beside George Bush and Tony Blair in the run-up to war, was staring at political disaster yesterday as anti-war demonstrations spread and opinion polls revealed 91% of Spaniards against the war.”)
The headline says it all. Tom
A long or a short war?
By Paul Rogers
openDemocracy
March 27, 2003After eight days of war in Iraq, there is growing evidence that the campaign is not going the way the US and Britain wanted or expected. The situation remains very fluid, with an enormous amount of misinformation coming from both sides.
One way to try and make some sense of it is to examine the range of possible outcomes. On this basis, and on a best estimate, there were at the outset of war five ways in which it could have been expected to go to a conclusion. Each outcome had a different duration, ranging from one-to-two weeks to a year or more. These will be examined in turn.
The first outcome: ‘Shock and Awe’
The ‘shock and awe’ tactic of massive bombing of the Iraqi leadership and military causes the immediate collapse of the regime, and the assassination of Saddam Hussein, with little or no fighting on the ground. Duration: 3-5 days.
To read more Rogers click here
The Other Superpower
by Jonathan Schell
The Nation Magazine
April 14, 2003As the war began, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld promised a “campaign unlike any other in history.” What he did not plan or expect, however, was that the peoples of earth–what some are calling “the other superpower”–would launch an opposing campaign destined to be even less like any other in history. Indeed, Rumsfeld’s campaign, a military attack, was in all its essential elements as old as history. The other campaign–the one opposing the war–meanwhile, was authentically novel. In the pages that follow, The Nation gives a snapshot of it in fourteen countries. If news has anything to do with what is new, then this campaign’s birth and activity are the real news. What emerges is a portrait of a world in resistance.